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Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm
Katharina Pistor
I. INTRODUCTION
The label “Law and Finance” stands for a body of literature that
has dominated policy-making and academic debates for the past
decade. The literature has its origin in a series of papers co-authored
by Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and
a cohort of other researchers, including Robert Vishny, Simeon
Djankov et al. (hereinafter referred to as LLS et al.).1 More than ten
years after “Law and Finance” was first published, it seems
appropriate to step back and consider the contribution this literature
has made, but also to point out where it has gone astray and deviated
attention from what the critical issues are for Law and Finance and,
more broadly, for law and development. The lead authors of this
literature have given their own assessment of theirs as well as of
related work in a paper that has recently been published by the
Journal of Economic Literature, which I will refer to throughout this
essay.2 The second part of this essay will be devoted to a critique of
the Law and Finance paradigm. The third part will sketch out
alternative strategies for analyzing the role of law and legal


Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank
participants at the symposium on “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory” for insightful comments
and suggestions. Thanks also to my co-author Curtis Milhaupt for the book Law and
Capitalism on which the analysis in Part II of this paper rests. All remaining errors or
misrepresentations are mine.
1. The original paper is Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, et al., Law and
Finance]. The paper Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, LII J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance] was published earlier, but builds on Law
and Finance. The difference in publication dates is most likely related to the pace of
publication at different journals. Several other papers test specific applications of the paradigm
established in this work. They will be referred to later in this paper if and when relevant.
Conceptually more important is Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595
(2003), as they seek to explain the origins of different types of legal systems.
2. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 285 (2008).
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institutions and the relation between legal and economic change in
comparative perspective.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE LAW AND FINANCE PARADIGM
Before developing the critique it seems useful to summarize the
key arguments of the Law and Finance literature. First, countries can
be divided into different legal traditions, or legal origins. The most
important divide is between the common law system and the civil
law system.3 Second, legal indicators that measure the protection of
owners, investors, and those that are generally “business friendly”4
differ among countries with different legal origins. In general,
common law countries are more business friendly than civil law
countries. Third, common law countries are also associated with
better-developed financial markets. Fourth, law is a determinant
(cause) of the observed economic outcomes.
My critique of this paradigm can be summarized in three points:
(1) the extrapolation fallacy; (2) the transmission problem; and (3)
the exogeneity paradox.
A. The Extrapolation Fallacy
The practice of developing theories about complex systems, such
as markets, society, or law, from simple micro-level models
(contractual relations) gives rise to an extrapolation fallacy. This
strategy assumes that a market is equivalent to the sum of all
contracts or can be fully explained by multiplying stakeholder
relations at a single firm by the number of firms in the market. The
extrapolation fallacy permeates economic theories and thus is not a
critique specifically of the work of LLS et al. Indeed, economics has
so far failed to offer a comprehensive theory of the market, and
instead focuses on contracts, property rights, and firms. As is well

3. This is obviously not an original finding but builds on well-established traditions in
comparative law. The literature is voluminous. For several of the most well-known accounts,
see RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
(1985); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1998);
John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the
Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357 (1981).
4. This is the standard used for the World Bank’s Doing Business reports, for which
and with whose funding many of the indicators have been created. For details, see
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
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known, even this categorization is a relatively late development and
one that has not come easy to classic economics, which treated a firm
simply as a production function. In 1937, Ronald Coase famously
posed the question why firms exist, i.e., why we observe not only
arms length contractual relations among individuals, but also
vertically integrated organizations.5 This question triggered (with
some lag effect) a new sub-discipline: the theory of the firm.6
Explaining who or what populates markets does not answer the
question, what markets are and how they are constituted. To most
economists this is not a relevant question, as markets are assumed
and therefore don’t need to be explained. According to this view
markets represent the state of nature. Firms, law, and other features
are the non-market features that require explanation. It is fully
consistent with this basic assumption to explain the emergence of
firms as a response to market imperfections—whether rooted in
transaction costs7 or incompleteness of contracts.8 Law and legal
institutions feature as accidentals to these market imperfections.
Because markets are burdened by transaction costs, firms exist; and
since firms are replete with agency costs, law is needed to mitigate
these costs.
This line of reasoning has been clearly spelled out in an earlier
paper by two of the lead authors of the Law and Finance literature,
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.9 The logic of their argument is as
simple as it is compelling if one accepts the above premises: Firms
need capital to grow and expand. The most important source of

5. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
6. Major contributors to the theory of the firm include Williamson, Alchian, Demsetz,
Jensen and Meckling, and Grossman and Hart, to name just a few. For their contributions, see
specifically OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976); and Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
7. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 6; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
8. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 6; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of
Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999).
9. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737 (1997).
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capital is external capital supplied by investors in the form of debt or
equity. Investors will part with their money and invest in firms only if
they can be assured that they will receive a return on their
investment. Facing agency costs, investors will seek control over the
firm in return for capital. This puts them into a position where they
need to control the firm directly by acquiring a controlling stake.
Firms that rely on external capital should therefore have highly
concentrated ownership structures. However, when investors can
rely on law and legal institutions to protect their interests they can
afford to take smaller stakes. Rational investors prefer this because it
allows them to diversify their investments across multiple firms. As
LLS put it in their 2008 anniversary paper “legal protection of
outside investors limits the extent of expropriation of such investors
by corporate insiders, and thereby promotes financial
development.”10
The leap from a micro-level issue—the financing of firms—to the
macro-level issue—financial market development—is asserted, but
not explained. The missing link following the above logic must be
that legal protections not only facilitate diversification of financial
commitments by the existing investor base, but also and in addition,
must encourage small investors to put their savings in equity. This
then leads to the broadening of the investor base, which is associated
with bigger and deeper markets. Thus, law begets markets.
This causal nexus at the core of LLS et al.’s argument is that
legal origin determines financial market outcomes. It does, however,
question the key assumption in economics, which takes markets as a
given.11 It also passes over the fact that the market is now of a very
different kind. It is no longer limited to relatively few, big investors,
capable of exerting control over firms if they wish to do so. The
number of investors has multiplied and the relation between
investors and firms has become more complex. Facing information
problems, investors rely on intermediaries for making allocation
decisions, and on analysts and market watchdog institutions to
collect and monitor firm specific information.12 This results in a

10. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 285.
11. For a further exploration of this exogeneity paradox, see Section B below.
12. A substantial amount of literature seeks to explain in functional terms how all these
different actors contribute to efficient markets. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson
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multiplication of agency problems that cannot possibly be addressed
with firm level governance mechanisms, such as voting rights or
“anti-director rights.”13 As Adam Smith argued in his Lectures on
Jurisprudence, the increasing complexity of economic and social
relations requires an increasingly complex set of rules and
regulations.14
The point has not been lost on LLS et al. The early papers Law
and Finance and Legal Determinants of External Finance still link
the development of stock markets directly to firm level investor
protection. However, subsequent work focuses specifically on
securities law.15 The choice of securities as opposed to banking law is
interesting in and of itself and suggests a preference for financial
markets that are closer to the idealized market that feature in the
models of economists. Moreover, and not surprisingly, the
conceptual framework remains unchanged. Securities law is depicted
as an extension of individual investor protection.16 Thus, mandatory
disclosure rules are interpreted as facilitating private enforcement,
rather than as a means for governing complex financial markets
whose very existence depends on the accessibility and trustworthiness
of information.17 The specific role of regulators as lawmakers and law
enforcers is downplayed if not ignored.18 In a companion paper, the
emergence of financial regulators in the U.S. is explained as a
response to weak or corrupt courts, not as a necessary change in

& Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC
in the Corporate Governance Debate (Managerial Strategic Investment Company), 45 STAN. L.
REV. 985 (1993); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
13. This is the term LLS et al. use to refer to the shareholder rights index they created.
See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1127.
14. “The more improved any society is and the greater length the severall [sic] means of
supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of their laws and
regulations necessary to maintain justice, and prevent infringements of the right of property.”
5 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, in THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH, 16 (Ronald L. Meek et al. eds., 1982), available at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/196/0141-06_Bk.pdf.
15. Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. On the role of regulators as ‘residual’ lawmakers and law enforcers, see Katharina
Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 J. INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003).
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governance called for by changes in the market place.19 Thus, the
market in the state of nature remains the ideal type against which
markets in the real world are benchmarked. Institutional features are
add-ons, not constitutive of markets. Their function is to bring the
market close to its assumed true nature. The implication is that there
is only a single optimal (efficient) market model and a single set of
optimal rules that can bring it about.
The extrapolation from simple contractual models of the firm to
complex financial markets does a disfavor to our understanding of
markets and legal systems. If markets are rooted in legal
arrangements, then the type of market that emerges is a product of
political and legal choice, not an approximation of the state of
nature. While it may still be useful to analyze what legal
arrangements produce certain market outcomes, the choice of
outcome variables is not a given (the “efficient market”), but
becomes open to normative debate. Thus, it is not a foregone
conclusion that bigger stock or credit markets are necessarily
better—a lesson brought home by the global financial crisis.
Assuming that micro-level institutions, in particular the quality of
investor rights protection in firms, are perhaps not the only, but still
important determinants for market development one would expect
that LLS et al. run the basic test whether countries with better legal
protection do indeed have better financial systems. However, this
would raise problems of reverse causality. It may well be, and indeed
has been documented,20 that law typically lags market development.
Thus, better investor protections tend to be a response to market
development and the crisis associated with it. The authors, therefore,
emphasize a different finding, namely that “legal rules protecting
investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins.”21 The
choice of legal origin rather than rules on investor protection
allegedly resolves the reverse causality issue, because the legal family
19. Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853 (2001). For
an alternative explanation on the rise of regulators in financial markets, see Pistor & Xu, supra
note 18.
20. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2002) (documenting the development of
corporate law in ten jurisdictions for a two hundred year period). Further analysis by the same
authors suggests that intensive periods of legal reform coincide with periods of rapid economic
development, at least for “origin countries,” not, however, for legal transplants. See Katharina
Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 676 (2003).
21. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 285 (summarizing the results of their earlier work).
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countries belong to was for the most part determined by legal
transplants. Legal origin can therefore be used as an instrumental
variable for statistical purposes. In subsequent work by the same
authors and numerous studies they inspired, the divide between
these different legal traditions takes center stage. As LLS et al. and
Djankov explain in their 2003 paper on the “New Comparative
Economics,”22 after the demise of the socialist system the new
frontier of comparative system analysis has become legal origin.
The arguments and debates do indeed sometimes resemble the
battle of ideologies during the cold war. In this debate the
development of financial markets and its determinants has taken a
back seat to legal origin. LLS and their co-authors ventured into
studying the size of governments, formalism in court procedures,
and barriers to entry as other applications of their legal origin theory.
New and improved indices were developed over time and in their
anniversary paper they finally come around to explaining that legal
origin is not so much about specific legal rules, but rather about a
mode of social ordering.23 Nonetheless, the basic methodological
approach, the extrapolation from simple models rooted in bilateral
bargains to complex systems, has remained unchanged and so has the
endorsement of the concept of a single, efficient model of market as
the desirable outcome variable.
This approach not only underestimates the complexity of markets
and their evolution, it also presents a rather crude picture of legal
systems. Law is a complex system that cannot be reduced to the
enforcement of property rights and contracts for the purpose of
creating an ideal market.24 That, however, is implied by theories that
are based exclusively on bargaining models and seek to tip the
bargaining process in favor of the investor constituency. To be
effective, legal systems must be perceived to be legitimate;25 i.e., they
must be rooted in shared norms.26 Specific legal rules reflect the
22. See supra note 1.
23. La Porta et al., supra note 2.
24. An ideal market fails to materialize absent such legal prop-ups and, as the global
financial crisis suggests, is capable of systemic failure even with such prop-ups in place.
25. Max Weber has stressed the importance of legitimacy in his attempts to explain
different sources of authority, including legal authority. For details, see MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
26. Whether or not a legal system reflects shared norms depends on its genesis. Legal
systems that result from wholesale transplants are much less likely to do so than are legal
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compromise reached at a given point in time. Because legal change is
slow and path dependent, a legal system more accurately reflects
accumulated past bargains than current preferences. This does not
preclude legal change, but such change could turn out to be
spurious. Today’s legal system of any country thus embodies a
tension between past bargains—the preferences that have become
institutionalized, i.e. codified in laws, precedents, and practices—and
today’s bargains spelled out in specific legal interventions, which may
or may not be consistent with a country’s legal legacy. This raises the
question of how to capture the ‘nature’ of a country’s legal system as
opposed to superficial legal rules. In most of their work, LLS et al.
side-step the issue by using specific rules to identify systemic
differences between legal systems, in effect using similarities of rules
within legal families as a proxy for a legal system. The implied
justification is that common versus civil law systems differ
systematically in their preferences for specific rules. But that could be
superficial. Countries belonging to the same legal family may simply
continue to borrow from lead countries of the legal family they
belong to without necessarily subscribing to the norms these
borrowed rules embody.27 In fact most colonies have continued to
borrow directly or indirectly from their colonizer’s legal system,
simply because this is the law their lawyers were trained with (and
often the country they were trained in) and the institutions they are
familiar with. In their anniversary article LLS et al. now seek to
differentiate between deep-seated preferences, or the hard-wired
features of a legal system on one hand, and specific legal rules, or its
software on the other. However, they hardly resolve the tension
between the two, which would imply that legal change superimposed
on countries that belong to a different legal family that embodies a
different set of normative principles is probably futile. Instead, they
attempt to identify areas of the law where they believe change in

systems that evolved in a more endogenous fashion. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003). Note that LLS et al. concede as much in
their anniversary article. See La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326. But this is inconsistent with
the very assumptions on which their research project rests.
27. There is indeed evidence that countries often copy blindly from others in the same
legal family. See ROBERT CHARLES MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LAW (Morris S. Arnold ed., 1980) (account of codification and re-codification processes in
Colombia).
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legal rules may alter economic outcomes,28 without further
explaining why that should be the case and why they selected these
areas of the law in particular.
Moreover, the problem runs even deeper. It is by no means clear
that the rules captured in the various indices LLS et al. have
constructed reflect core features of the legal systems they are
supposed to represent as opposed to spurious factors. Indeed, it has
been shown that once the original data on shareholder and creditor
rights are corrected based on more careful legal analysis, most of the
results no longer hold.29 Yet, numerous other studies by LLS and
others suggest that there is a systematic difference between common
law and civil law systems. As I have argued elsewhere,30 these
differences appear to be highly correlated with features identified by
the socio-economic literature on comparative capitalism: This
literature characterizes countries as ‘liberal’ or ‘coordinated’ market
economies based on how they organize intra- and inter-firm
relations.31 It appears that most common law countries are liberal
market economies and most civil law countries coordinated market
economies. This would imply both different normative preferences
and different legal rules. Notably, many of these coordinated market
economies have done remarkably well in the post WWII period.32
The latest interpretation of legal origin by LLS as a “highly persistent
system of social control”33 follows a similar trend. The authors have
now distanced themselves from specific legal indicators and are
instead emphasizing systemic features that result from the

28. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 325. The areas of the law they identify include
“entry regulations, disclosure requirements, or some procedural rules in litigation.” Id.
29. Holger Spamann did this labor-intensive recoding effort. Holger Spamann, Law and
Finance Revisited (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008).
30. Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN
EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S. 249, 249–80 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 2005).
31. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). Note that in contrast
to the economics literature, in this approach the firm is not an anomaly of markets in need of
explanation, but a core feature that reveals broader organizational features of markets and
society.
32. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD (2008) (showing that the propensity of common law and civil law
countries to grow more rapidly is contingent on the time period selected).
33. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326.
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institutionalization of past practices. This conceptual move, however,
re-opens the Pandora’s Box of causality between law and economic
outcomes, which the authors sought to avoid by using legal origin as
an instrument, which should not be directly related to the legal rules
produced by it.34
B. The Transmission Problem
The transmission problem addresses the causal nexus between
legal origin, the specific legal provisions found in statutes and
regulations, and economic outcomes. In their anniversary paper, LLS
depict the relation between origin, legal rules, and economic
outcomes in a flow chart that leads from “Legal Origin” to “Legal
Institutions” to economic “Outcomes.” A simplified version of the
chart focusing only on the nexus described in LLSV (1998) looks
like this:
Legal Origins

Company Law

Stock Markets

It remains unclear, however, how legal origin is linked to the
specific rules that ultimately affect outcomes. LLS suggest that a
country’s legal tradition is the foundation for social outcomes and
specific rules are the transmission belt between legal origin and
outcomes. This could be interpreted to suggest that given a
particular legal origin only certain rules are feasible; and that
whatever the rules are, they are unlikely to affect outcomes if they
conflict with basic features of the legal system that are not malleable
to change.
The failure to explain the link between legal origin and specific
legal institutions is particularly disconcerting when this framework is
used for policy purposes. After all, most of the LLS et al. studies
were sponsored by the World Bank and the World Bank has used the

34. LLS et al. gloss over this point by arguing that the transplantation of law entailed
not only the transplantation of rules, but also of other organizational features of law and legal
systems. That, however, differs from country to country. Moreover, persistent differences
between law exporting and law importing countries in terms of the level of rule of law today
over 100 years after colonialism brought about the most extensive transplantation process,
speaks against this assertion. On this point, see La Porta et al., supra note 2, showing that legal
origin is not an important explanatory variable for outcome variables measuring legality;
instead the manner of law development, i.e. whether it has been receptive or unreceptive.
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indicators for assessing countries’ legal systems and to motivate
policy advice (Doing Business Project).35 LLS concede that if their
theory is correct, copying laws from the common law system and
implanting it in a civil law system is unlikely to make much of a
difference.36 Yet, they reject the notion that this implies destiny and
no hope for change.37 Instead they argue that some rules can be
changed without affecting the fundamentals of a legal system and
that these rules will nonetheless affect economic outcome.
Specifically, they argue, “[E]ntry regulations, disclosure
requirements, or some procedural rules in litigation can be reformed
without disturbing the fundamental of the legal system.”38 No
explanation is given as to why these rules and not others can be
modified without affecting the fundamentals of a given legal system;
moreover, no evidence is provided whether the specific rules they
mention did in fact have the desirable impact on outcomes in real
world cases. This, however, would be crucial before their framework
should be used as a blueprint for regulatory reform.
The underlying thrust of the argument appears to be that
entrepreneurship is best left to its own devices and that the
regulation of entry imposes unnecessary and socially harmful costs on
business.39 Reducing these costs should be compatible with any legal
system. This reasoning assumes away the normative priors of
different societies. Some societies may have a preference for
preventing harm even if this comes at substantial costs, while others
might prefer to address damages only once they have been caused.
Thus, from a normative perspective, entry barriers are not only
technical rules, or rent seeking devices, but reflect different values. It
may, of course, be the case that the means used to realize these
35. The first systematic compilation of legal indicators that were related to the ease of
doing business in different countries was published in 2004. See WORLDBANK, DOING
BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004). The database has been
subsequently expanded and is now available online at http://rru.worldbank.org/
Documents/DoingBusiness/2004/DB2004-full-report.pdf.
36. See La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 325 (“The [legal origin] theory indeed holds
that some aspects of the legal tradition are so hard-wired that changing them would be
extremely costly and that reforms must be sensitive to legal traditions.”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. On the fallacy of this argument, see Benito Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid When
Measuring the Institutional Environment: Is Doing Business Damaging Business?, 35 J. COMP.
ECON. 729, 730 (2007) (suggesting that this rent-seeking interpretation misses the potential
social values of entry barriers or other aspects of formality).
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values are ineffective, socially wasteful, or both. Yet, disregard for the
normative aspect of law and legislation can easily lead policy makers
astray. It is relatively simple to change the laws on the books, but, as
is well known and by now well documented, it is much harder to
change established practices and the normative priors that inform
them.40 Investing resources in legislative change that can be easily
undone by introducing counter-veiling rules or switching to informal
practices is equally a social waste.41
LLS also assert that these “rules can point the reformer closer to
where the problem actually lies”;42 in other words, the legal variables
they identify could serve as diagnostic tools for policy reform. This,
of course, is true only if formal entry barriers, for example, are the
root cause for large informal sectors and low entry into the formal
sector and/or if there are no substitutes to formal entry barriers. In
fact, it is equally possible that the standardization of rules will
disguise rather than point to the root cause of the problems many
countries are facing today. Specifically, if there are entrenched
interest groups that seek to exclude new entrants, it is unlikely that a
formal rule alone will transform the underlying power relations. If
strong normative priors (or entrenched interests) speak against the
liberalization of entry, other means can easily be found to restrict
it—for example, by licensing particular types of activities or delaying
other necessary permits (construction, zoning, etc.) that might be
necessary for starting a business.
Finally, in the flow chart that depicts the relation between legal
origin, legal rules, and outcomes, there is no feedback loop from
economic outcomes to the institutions (the specific rules) or to legal
origin. Suppose, however, the “market friendly” intervention of
lowering entry barriers by changing formal rules succeeds and there

40. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 26, at 179–90.
41. Take the following example, which Benito Arruñada cites in his paper, supra note
39, at 732 n.9:
[A]s a result of the reforms financed by the US development agency (USAID) and
according to Doing Business 2007, Afghanistan has reached position 17 in the world
for ease of setting up a business for which, according to this report, only three
formalities are needed, taking about eight days (on-line data, 17 May 2007).
However, Afghan entrepreneurs tell a different story. Although the actual company
incorporation can be done fast, up to 18 months are needed to obtain the licenses
required to start operating. The reforms have just postponed the most important
restrictions until after the legal incorporation.
42. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326.
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is an influx of new firms into the market. In LLS’s world this would
have an impact on economic outcomes, but would not affect the
fundamentals of the legal system, which continues to re-produce
rules that re-enforce legal origin. But why would one not expect that
the influx of new entrepreneurs influence the direction of future
legislation, which at least over time should also affect a legal system’s
fundamentals? Thus, if the basic premise is correct—that well
functioning markets produce socially desirable outcomes—the
experience of these benefits, and perhaps even more importantly, the
changing political economy that results from such changes should
leave an imprint on legal origin. Perhaps path dependence is simply
too strong. Yet, if those feedback loops do not operate, why would
anyone expect any lasting effect from changing a couple of formal
rules even in the selected areas of the law LLS et al. suggest?
Conceding that such feedback loops might exist would open the
possibility for a new area of research on the political economy of
legal change, which could ultimately prove to be more fruitful for
policy considerations than the ideological battle about legal origin.43
C. The Exogeneity Paradox
The legal origin theory and, even more so, the empirical results
used to produce evidence in support of this theory are based on the
assumption that legal origin is exogenous and that therefore we can
isolate its effect from the effect of social systems (culture, politics,
etc.). Yet, the legal origin theory is most powerful when applied to
the origin countries (France, Germany, the UK, arguably the U.S.),
not to countries to which these systems were transplanted.
As LLS state in their anniversary paper: “Although the evidence
on reforms is just beginning to come in and much of it is
unfortunately confined to the developed world, many countries seem to
be moving toward market-friendlier government interventions. If the
world remains peaceful and orderly, the attraction of such reforms
will only grow.”44 This statement reveals the authors’ normative
goals: market friendliness.45 While common law is not always and
43. For a summary of micro-level studies that explore the political economy of legal and
institutional change, see Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy and Development,
25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 257 (2009).
44. La Porta et al., supra note 2, at 326 (emphasis added).
45. Id. For a critique of this normative bias, see also WORLDBANK, DOING BUSINESS:
AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION (2008), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
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under all circumstances more market friendly, it is so most of the
time, which is why it is the preferred model. From a development
perspective the puzzle is that market-friendly policies are not always
producing sustainable growth. LLS insist that the relevant
transmission channels are financial markets, but in doing so they
must assume that financial market development produces growth
over time. Indeed, this is precisely what the authors suggest,
although the caveats they include are important:
The world economy in the last quarter century has been
surprisingly calm, and has moved sharply toward capitalism and
markets. In that environment, our framework suggests that the
common law approach to social control of economic life performs
better than the civil law approach. When markets do or can work
well, it is better to support than to replace them. As long as the
world economy remains free of war, major financial crises, or other
extraordinary disturbances, the competitive pressures for marketsupporting regulation will remain strong and we are likely to see
continued liberalization. Of course, underlying this prediction is a
hopeful assumption that nothing like World War II of the Great
Depression will repeat itself. If it does, countries are likely to
embrace civil law solutions, just as they did back then.46

The paper was published in June 2008, just at the time the global
financial market crisis unfolded. Given how few observers (including
but not limited to economists) predicted that de-regulated financial
markets could bring the entire global financial system to the brink of
collapse, it would be unfair to hold this against LLS et al. However,
two points can be made. First, if both political and economic stability
is a precondition for the success of market friendly policies as implied
by the above quote, then this should be factored into policy advice
given to developing countries, many of which suffer from political
and economic instability. Indeed, it has been suggested that the
relentless pursuit of pro-market reforms in fragile countries may have
exacerbated latent political and ethnic conflicts and further
destabilized them.47 Second, the statement seems oblivious to the
EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTDOIBUS/0,,contentMDK:21679357~pagePK:64829573~piP
K:64829550~theSitePK:4663967~isCURL:Y,00.html.
46. La Porta et al., supra note 3, at 327.
47. Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law
and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998). The argument is, of course, not novel. For an

1660

DO NOT DELETE

1647

2/3/2010 7:30 PM

Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm

series of financial crises that emerging markets have experienced over
the past two decades, including the Mexico’s Tequila Crisis (1994),
the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98; the subsequent crisis in
Russia; and Argentina’s meltdown in 2001. Long-term cross-country
empirical evidence suggests that financial crises are highly correlated
with preceding episodes of financial liberalization,48 i.e. the
introduction of ‘market-friendly’ policies and their legal correlates. A
serious consideration of the experience of emerging markets in
response to financial liberalization in conjunction with the
recognition that the most convincing evidence on the benefits of the
common law comes from developed countries should give one pause
about the policy implications of this line of research.
The relation between crises and legal ordering noted in the
second quote is also interesting. If crisis trigger the type of legislative
interventions that are associated with civil law regimes, an analysis of
crisis in recent history may be a better predictor for the nature of a
country’s legal regime than the historical origin of its legal system.
Indeed, it is well known that crises tend to trigger extensive
legislative responses. Thus, the stock market crash of 1929 in the
U.S. was followed by wave of securities and banking regulations that
strengthened centralized regulation vis-à-vis the states and selfregulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges.49 Moreover,
the experience with hyperinflation in Continental European
countries in the aftermath of World War I has been associated with
the “great reversal” in the management of financial markets.50
account of how pro-market reforms have de-stabilized social relations in England, the mother
country of the common law, see KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). See
also ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT (2001).
48. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reihnhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes of
Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 473 (1999). In fact, some
observers suggest that global financial crisis, which originated in the United States, is no
exception. The only difference is that the liberalization of the subprime and derivative markets
was, for the most part, informal rather than formal. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S.
Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Crisis so Different? An International Historical Comparison
(Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13761, 2008).
49. On the history of the New Deal financial regulatory reforms, see Joel Seligman, The
Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983) and Paul
G. Mahoney, The Pernicious Art of Securities Regulation, U. CHI. L. REV. 1373 (1999). For a
broader historical analysis, see Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. L. REV. Q. 849 (1997).
50. Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Corporate
Control and Labor Rents, 114 J. POL. ECON. 145 (2006) (arguing that the great reversal,
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Further, the experience with economic management during World
War II has led the UK to nationalize substantial parts of its industry
in the immediate post-war era. Thus, legal change seems to respond
to economic and political events and sometimes to do so quite
drastically. Indeed, according to the varieties of capitalism literature,
both the UK and Ireland were classified as coordinated rather than
liberal market economies for part of the post war period.51 These
changes are difficult to explain with recourse to legal origin. While
many of these changes have been reversed, this too cannot simply be
attributed to legal origin, but requires the introduction of human
agency, and indeed of political economy.52 In short, a consistent
theory of legal development has to recognize that legal change is
endogenous to political and economic change. That, of course,
would challenge the notion that legal origin is exogenous and can
therefore be used as an instrument for the purpose of econometric
analysis—a premise that is crucial for the statistical validity of the
work of LLS et al.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The Law and Finance literature has made a major contribution in
bringing the analysis of law and legal institutions to the forefront of
comparative economics.53 It is not surprising that a contribution of
this scope and scale receives both applause and critique. In this
section of this essay I will try to develop an alternative approach to

which was identified as coinciding with World War I by Rajan and Zingales is associated with
episodes of hyperinflation); see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals:
The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003). For a
critique of Rajan and Zingales, see La Porta et al., supra note 2, who question the accuracy of
their data and point out that much of the market capitalization in French civil law countries
came from government bonds. However, that should not be so troubling in light of the fact
that even in England, corporate securities as a share of total securities traded on the London
Stock Exchange exceeded government bonds only in the 1860s. See RANALD C. MICHIE, THE
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY (1999).
51. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 31, at 8–9.
52. Unfortunately, they try to prove the primacy of legal origin over politics and thus
have downplayed politics in their analysis. This was primarily in response to Mark Roe’s work,
which stresses politics as a determinant of legal choice. See MARK ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
53. Indeed, they have named this line of research the “new comparative economics.” See
Djankov et al., supra note 1.
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analyzing the role of law in economic systems and the processes of
legal change in light of the critique I have developed in Part II. This
approach builds on my joint work with Curtis Milhaupt in our recent
book on law and capitalism.54
The approach is based on the premise that countries differ not
only with respect to their legal system, but also with respect to their
economic system. In fact, we suggest that the relation can be
depicted as a “rolling relation,” in which changes and events in the
economy give rise to legal change (or the use of existing law), and
vice versa.55 In contrast to LLS et al., we do not endorse a particular
form of economic organizations—i.e. “the market”—as optimal or
superior,56 and instead suggest that different types of capitalist
economies have proven remarkably successful in promoting
economic growth and development. Capitalist systems by definition
contain a strong element of markets, but the scope of markets and
the way in which they are governed can differ considerably. The
most impressive growth spurts in the post World War II period,
those of the East Asian tigers and dragons in particular, and more
recently of China, took place in countries with legal and economic
systems that display features of centralized organization and
coordination.57 If different systems can be highly economically
54. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 32 (see especially the introductory chapter
and the note on the “institutional autopsy” that precedes the case-study analysis).
55. Id. at 28.
56. See VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 31.
57. There is a voluminous literature on the growth experience of these countries. See,
e.g., ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2003); WORLDBANK, THE EAST ASIAN
MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993); ADB, EMERGING ASIA,
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES (1997); ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA
AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); YASHING HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS (2008); BARRY NAUGHTON, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S
ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 91 (Loren Bradt
& Thomas Rawski eds., 2008); Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in SEARCH OF
PROSPERITY: ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 227 (Dani Rodrik ed.,
2003). For specific treatment on the legal development of major economies in East and
Southeast Asia, see KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1999). For a comparative
sociological account that emphasizes differences in the organization of firms even within Asia,
see GARY G. HAMILTON & NICOLE WOOLSEY BIGGART, MARKET, CULTURE, AND
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION IN THE FAR
EAST, IN THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 111 (Marco Orru et al.
eds., 1997).
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successful it makes little sense to propagate that one is superior and
must serve as a model for countries to grow and prosper. Instead, it
may be more productive to try to understand under what conditions
they can produce the desired economic outcomes. By the same
token, each system may not only have strengths, but also weaknesses.
We therefore posit that each system is likely to have its own inherent
vulnerabilities, which need to be analyzed and understood in order
to understand the trade-offs among different systems. Moreover, if—
as we suggest—legal and economic systems stand to each other in a
rolling relationship, attempts to locate the ultimate determinants for
observed outcomes in either law or economics (or politics for that
matter) must be futile as this suggests that the relation among these
various factors is highly endogenous. A more productive approach
then is to seek to understand the iterative process of change in each
system and to situate the contribution that law makes to change.
Clearly, this cannot be done by large n-studies, but requires a casestudy approach.
Case-study analysis has received a bad name especially in
economics; they are accused of being too specific to allow for
generalizations; and to get bogged down by too many explanatory
variables. Some of these problems can be avoided. This is true in
particular for the excessive variables problem. A valid theoretical
framework helps reduce the pool of reasonable explanations for case
studies as it does for large n-studies.58 Well-selected comparative case
analysis (whether historical or cross-country) also helps focus the
research.59
Case studies have advantages that cannot be replicated in large nstudies. They allow for context specificity as well as consideration of
variables that may be relevant for some countries, but are irrelevant
in other contexts. Moreover, they are less dependent on the
availability of data for large samples; and lack of data often restricts
the introduction of proper control, even outcome, variables. From
the perspective of comparative law methodology case studies also
have the distinct advantage of accounting for the fact that different
legal systems may address the same problem in different ways. By
simply asking whether a particular legal provision exists or does not
58. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY (1994) (describing in detail
the “dos and don’ts” of such an analysis).
59. See CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES, HUGE COMPARISONS
(1989) (describing the methodological aspects of such comparisons).
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exist in another legal system, large n-studies commit what is widely
regarded as a cardinal error in comparative institutional analysis: they
assume that there is only a single solution to a problem. In fact,
different legal systems can solve the same problem in numerous
ways—most lawyers could even point to more than one solution
within a single legal system. An approach that seeks to identify
functional equivalents in different legal systems, of course, requires
familiarity with law in different legal systems, which is why the
sample of countries that can be concluded in such a comparative
analysis will be bounded by the knowledge of the researchers
conducting the study. And finally, case studies do not require the
researcher to use a single parameter for all countries, such as
restricting the analysis to a particular point in time—which may give
the impression of neutrality or objectivity, but may bias the outcome
(i.e. the year or period chosen may be an outlier, or reveal short term
rather than long term trends). Comparability is, of course, important
if one wishes to draw broader conclusions form a case study or
proceed to comparative case analysis. What parameters are used
therefore becomes a critical part of the research design. In principle,
the same should apply to large n-studies. Thus, the choice to use
stock market data for the year 1993 as the relevant outcome data by
LLSV60 could be questioned. Choosing the year 1987 or 2007
might produce quite different results. One response to this is to
analyze longer trends, but this would also require coding legal data
for more than one year, which requires enormous resources.61
For the purpose of the comparative case study analysis we
develop in Law and Capitalism we use a major firm level corporate
governance crisis as the parameter. Thus, we select countries from a
restricted pool of countries that experienced a major corporate
governance crisis in recent years—but without imposing a restriction
that the crisis had to occur in the same year or affected the same type
of firm. Crises can be described as outliers—implying that they
should be discarded for understanding the normal state of affairs.

60. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1.
61. Simon Deakin and his team have undertaken such an effort, but at least in the short
term had to confine themselves to fewer countries in order to live up to their standards for
comprehensive legal coding. For details, see John Armour et al., How do Legal Rules Evolve?
Evidence from Cross Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection (Univ.
of Cambridge Working Paper Center for Business Research No. 382, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1431008.
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Yet, crises are more likely to reveal critical features of a complex
system that remain undetected in the normal state. The purpose of a
crisis analysis is not primarily to understand the cause of a specific
corporate governance failure, but to learn about the system in which
this failure occurred. This is akin to the approach an academic
pathologist follows when conducting an autopsy; it is not simply to
understand the cause of death in this patient, but to learn about the
human body. We therefore call our case study approach an
“institutional autopsy.” Moreover, by focusing on a crisis, we address
one of the problems associated with case study analysis—the use of
excessive numbers of variables. A differential diagnosis of the features
that contributed to the crisis helps discriminate among possible
explanatory variables and focus on those that are of primary
relevance. An important condition for making these kinds of
inferences is that it can be established that this crisis is not an outlier
but representative of similar breakdown in a given country. This
point re-enforces the point that contextualized system analysis
requires familiarity with the system under investigation.
We hypothesize that the nature of the crisis varies across different
systems and is related to features of the system in which it occurred.
We characterize legal systems along two dimensions: their
organization and function. A legal system may be centralized or
decentralized. The level of centralization refers to the allocation of
power to affect legal change. Centralized systems tend to vest the
power to affect legal change with large and well-organized interest
groups. Decentralized systems, in contrast, vest these powers with
individuals who can initiate legal change, for example, by bringing a
lawsuit or challenging the decisions of a regulator. Not every lawsuit
will trigger legal change. Thus, the extent to which an individual or
only a well-organized group with close connections to the center of
power can affect the future path of legal development becomes of
critical importance. An extreme version of centralization is state
control; and we label the Russian legal system under Putin in this
way. Beyond this extreme case there can be intermediate cases; the
decentralization/centralization dimension thus describes a
continuum, not a binary state of affairs.
The function of law also differs from system to system. A legal
system’s primary function may be to establish individual rights and
empowerments as a matter of substantive law and to protect these
rights by affording them procedural remedies. Instead, a legal system
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may vest powers with groups or organizations, or allocate rights and
entitlements to more than one constituency. This will compel
individuals to organize or groups to cooperate with each other
and/or with the state. We call systems that emphasize individual
entitlements “protective” and those that emphasize cooperation
“coordinative.” Again, these are not discrete variables, but describe a
continuum. There is some affinity between these two dimensions.
Systems that are relatively centralized tend to be more coordinative;
and systems that are more decentralized tend to be more protective.
However, not all countries follow this pattern or do so in all areas of
the law. Thus, the English legal system displays strong features of a
decentralized and protective legal system; yet its takeover panel
arrangements suggests a much greater willingness and institutional
ability to coordinate than does the U.S. litigation based system.62
We hypothesize that the organizational and functional features of
legal systems make countries prone to different types of crisis and are
also like to trigger different responses to such crisis. Thus a
centralized system can suffer from abuse at the center; it is also
vulnerable to defection from established interest groups whether by
incumbents who change allegiances or by new entrants who refuse to
play by the rules of the established system and use available legal
devices to challenge its viability. In contrast, a decentralized system is
vulnerable to excessive agency costs in the complex monitoring and
governance mechanisms inherent in such a system; it also tends to be
slow in responding to crisis precisely because it lacks centralized
coordination mechanisms. Attempts to correct for this might be
challenged by individuals mobilizing their rights against
centralization efforts.
This framework has certain affinities with the legal origin debate,
but also departs from it in important ways. The decentralized,
protective mode of legal system fits the idealized description of the
common law system; and the centralized, coordinative mode reflects
important features of the civil law system. However, whereas LLS
depict legal origin as in immutable, hardwired feature our framework
allows for change over time. It is also more amenable to detecting
changes within each legal family. Thus, as indicated above, in
62. This contrast and its economic efficiency is discussed in detail by John Armour &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation (UCLA, Working Paper, No. 73, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928928.
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corporate law we find important differences between the UK and the
United States. Moreover, Singapore, a country that features in our
case analysis of the China Aviation Oil Company on the Singapore
stock exchange, can be classified as a common law country by legal
origin. However, our institutional autopsy reveals that the crisis
resolution does not occur in a decentralized rights based fashion that
is associated with the common law. Instead, it is closely coordinated
at the center. Similarly, Germany, Japan, Russia, and South Korea—
the four ‘civilian’ systems we study—all belong to the Germanic civil
law family. Still, the degree of centralization as well as the
constituencies empowered to partake in the coordination of
economic and social relations differ markedly across these countries.
Lastly, our framework does not take law as a given, but investigates
the role of legal change in relation to a crisis. This includes an
analysis of the contribution law or specific legal rules may have made
to the crisis we investigate; but also of the ways in which law is
mobilized (and by whom) in response to the crisis. In other words,
we are interested in law in action, not in the law on the books,
neither in law applied to hypothetical cases, which may or may not
be relevant to the economy in question.63 What we find in general is
that as a result of international efforts to standardize law and
establish best practices, the law on the books is increasingly
converging. One of the most interesting examples in this respect is
the codification of the Delaware takeover case law into soft law
guidelines in Japan.64 Closer inspection, however, reveals that the
meaning and usage of these laws differs in different countries. Thus,
in Japan the verdict is still out whether the anti-takeover guidelines
will facilitate the development of a more vibrant takeover market or
rather entrench existing interest groups that mobilize poison pills
and other takeover devices that are permissible under Delaware law
to fend off any attempt to challenge their dominance. So far the
evidence points in the latter direction. Similarly, in South Korea and
Germany judges have assumed an important role as gatekeepers of
63. Note that LLS et al. employed these two strategies. For a number of indices they
constructed, they coded the law on the books (i.e. corporate law and securities law). See La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 2; La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, supra note 1; see also La Porta et al., , supra note 2. For others they used hypothetical
cases, i.e. the number of days it takes to evict someone from an apartment or to enforce a
bounced check as a measure of a system’s formality. See, e.g., Raphael La Porta et al., Judicial
Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004).
64. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 32, at 57.
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the established normative system and have used their legal powers to
protect these norms even as changes in the corporate law or business
practice seem to push towards a more market-based or common law
system. Thus, in South Korea judges sided with the management of
a company the foreign investors of which sought to replace it by
declaring their attempt to mount a proxy fight against management a
takeover attempts. And in Germany the criminal legal system was
mobilized against the pay out of golden handshakes to management
that had caved into a hostile takeover bid and was about to take leave
from the company. The fact that investors and financial
intermediaries arbitrage around existing rules to maximize their
interests is well known. But similarly, the guardians of established
norms (however right or wrong they may appear to an outsider) can
switch tactics to ensure that their voices will be heard, indeed that
changes will be stopped if they threaten the very core of the system.
More generally, our systematic analysis of corporate crises in six
different jurisdictions suggests that law is hardly ever the only or
even the primary culprit of a crisis. Conversely, legal solutions are
not necessarily the most important remedy. Much depends on who
mobilizes law and to what ends. In short, our detailed case analyses
shed light on the processes of legal change that are treated as black
box in the large n empirical studies epitomized by the work by LLS
et al. These insights highlight that actual change is contingent on
non-legal factors and that therefore, any attempt to use the insights
gained from the Law and Finance literature for policy purposes
should be treated with great caution. As lawyers engaged in
comparative legal analysis of long established “looks can be
deceiving.”65 Moreover, once we recognize that legal systems are not
simply the sum of the indicators that we can find in statutes or codes,
but instead are broad systems of social ordering—as LLS concede in
their 2008 article—the methodology for analyzing legal systems
ought to change. To use once more a medical metaphor—the
emphasis then shifts from large-scale epidemiological studies to the
differential diagnosis of complex phenomena. While we may gain
insights about the optimal treatment once we know the diagnosis of
the underlying disease, the disease itself can hardly be identified with
epidemiological means alone.
65. Alan L. Beller et al., Looks Can Be Deceiving—A Comparison of Initial Public
Offering Procedures Under Japanese and U.S. Securities Laws, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77
(1992).
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IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The purpose of this essay has been two-fold: First, to take yet
another look at the literature spearheaded by LLS et al. and to assess
its contribution to the broader questions of the evolution of legal
and economic system and the proper role of policy interventions to
alter their course. Second, it has described in a nutshell an alternative
approach to legal and economic system analysis that uses case studies
rather than databases with binary variables that are in turn compiled
into indices and regressed against outcome variables. The paper
emphasized in particular the limited insights the large n-studies can
possibly provide for policy purposes. In conclusion it should be
noted that this author agrees with the LLS that legal origin does
represent a complex system of social ordering. This, of course, is not
a new insight but one that comparative legal scholars have noted
long ago. More importantly, however, it should trigger an
adaptation in the methodological approach championed by LLS and
numerous studies they have given rise to. Clearly, the benefit of data
sets is that they create economies of scale. According to a recent
article in The Economist on Doing Business in 2010, there are now
405 articles in academic journals and over 1000 working papers that
replicate in broad terms the findings by LLS.66 An open question is
whether these statistics indicate that we are closer to an
understanding of the interplay of economic and legal change. This
author suggests that this may not be the case.

66. Reforming Through the Tough Times, ECONOMIST 12–18, Sept. 10, 2009, at 71.
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